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1. Introduction  
Modern macroeconomic models with a Keynesian flavour usually involve nominal 
rigidities in wages and commodity prices. A typical microfoundation recurs to wage 
bargaining in the labour markets and monopolistic competition in the commodity markets 
(e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi). A characteristic feature of those models is that deregulating The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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the labour markets (i.e. reducing the bargaining power of workers and/or reducing the 
unemployment benefits) increases equilibrium employment; in a  symmetric way, 
deregulating the commodity markets (i.e. reducing the market power of commodity 
suppliers) increases equilibrium employment as well.  
However, those models are typically static models which do not specify explicitly the 
economic process in time. In the following paper, we develop a dynamic macroeconomic 
model in which commodity markets are characterised by monopolistic competition and 
labour markets by wage bargaining. In this first version, the number of firms is fixed. The 
incorporation of firm entry and exit is left for further research. 
In our analysis the usual equilibrium solution is a fixed point of the dynamic model which 
exhibits the usual comparative static properties (deregulating the labour and/or the 
commodity market increases employment). However, depending upon the parameters the 
fixed point may loose stability through a Flip-bifurcation giving rise to cyclical solutions. 
We show analytically that commodity and labour market deregulation may lead to 
instability; in numerical simulation we even found cases in which deregulation leads to 
lower average employment. Both results, valid in a dynamic framework, contrast with the 
usual comparative static properties.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section, we present the model the basic 
structure of which closely follows Blanchard/Giavazzi. Monopolistic competitive firms 
bargain with unions over employment and nominal wage rates on the basis of firms’ 
anticipated demand functions and workers’ nominal reservation wages. In the third section, 
we explicitly add two dynamic components. First, central to monopolistic competition is 
that firms neglect the reactions of other firms. They therefore base their decisions on too The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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high a price elasticity and are necessarily surprised b y the market results. As a 
consequence, they will adjust the position of their anticipated demand function over time. 
Second, the nominal reservation wage also adjusts through time on the basis of the realised 
employment rate and the realised nominal wage  rate.  Whereas for the second process 
several plausible specifications do exist, the specification of the first one is directly implied 
by the external effect at the core of the monopolistic competition model itself. We show, 
that the first process leads to diverging time paths: while it still holds that deregulation 
increases stationary employment rates, it leads to fundamental instability.  In the fourth 
section, we study two different  specifications of reservation wage adjustment, each of 
which mirrors a different institutional set up. We show analytically that this second process 
may dampen the sharp instability result: deregulation may still destabilise the economy; 
however, the time path does not diverge but is attracted to a period two cycle or eventually 
to a complex time path. Simulations complete the dynamic explorations. The last section is 
left for concluding remarks. 
 
2. The economic framework  
The analysis, being framed in a dynamic setting, requires dealing explicitly with time. We 
assume that during the time unit, which for expository purposes we call ‘Week t’, all events 
occur according to a well-defined sequence. On Monday of Week  t, firm  i and the 
associated union bargain over employment and the nominal wage rate on the basis of firms’ 
anticipated demand and workers’ nominal reservation wage. Production occurs during the 
week from Tuesday to Friday. On Friday commodities are delivered to the market. Market 
equilibrium determines the realised price. Finally, on Saturday firms and unions update the The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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information relevant for decisions in the following period concerning the employment rate, 
the nominal wage rate and the price index. 
2.1 Firms and Households 
The economy comprises m firms, each firm producing one differentiated good in a regime 
of monopolistic competition; and  L households which own the existing firms, each 






All firms share the same production technology, which involves only one  input, labour, 
used in a fixed proportion. Assuming that during Week t firm i’ employs 
t
i N  workers, the 
production of good i is: 
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for i = 1 … m.  
Following Blanchard and Gavazzi, household j’s preferences towards good i (for i = 1 … m 
and j = 1 … n) are represented by a CES utility function: 
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where 1 < s < ¥ is the elasticity of substitution between goods and 
t
i c  is the consumption 




m  into the utility 
function implies that the utility level depends only upon the overall consumption quantity The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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and not on the number of different consumption goods. This specification therefore does 
not represent a preference for commodity variety and s is a parameter related only to the 
market power of a single commodity supplier. In Blanchard and Gavazzi, it is the central 
parameter for studying the effects of commodity market deregulation.  














where Yj is the household j’s income and where 
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is a price index corresponding to the price of one unit of utility. Summing through j, we 
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where Y is the overall nominal income of the economy, which is taken as numéraire. Note 
that the elasticity of demand with respect to the own price is equal to  s - . 
If the price of each good is the same, 
t
it pp = , the price index becomes  tt Pp =  and the 
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In that case, the elasticity of demand with respect to the price is equal to  1 - . 
Moving on to the description of the events occurring during ‘Week  t’, most of our 
discussion will be devoted to the crucial ones, that is, the bargaining process and the 
determination of the market equilibrium. 
2.2 Bargaining 
During the Monday of week t the parties (firm i and the associated union) bargain over 
employment and the  nominal  wage rate on the basis of a known set of data relating to 
workers’ reservation wage and firm i’s anticipated demand function. In order to study this 
process we employ the efficient bargaining model. Our analysis differs from the text book 
treatment in that firms are monopolistically competitive (instead of perfectly competitive) 
in the commodity market.  
Typically, in models of monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz type each firm 
assumes that other firms will not react to its own price decisions.
1 Specifically, firm  i 
anticipates a demand function  t d %  with elasticity (– s) and position Kt, which is considered 












  (6) 
where 
t
i p %  is firm i’s anticipated price. 
                                                 
1 This is more plausible the larger the number of firms. See Currie and Kubin, 2002. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Firm i’s rent is given as its anticipated profit (with a fall back income equal to zero):  
  ( )
tttittit
fiitiiti RpxWNpWN =-=- %%   (8)  
with 
t
i N  denoting firm i’ employees for Week t and 
t
i W  denoting the nominal wage rate for 
Week t. 
Workers’ rent is determined as in the standard Efficiency bargaining model. If the contract 
is concluded the parties agree on  employment 
t
i N  and  a nominal wage rate 
t
i W .  The 
remaining members of the union 
t
ii MN -  have to find employment in other firms. The 
income of hired workers is  
 
tt
ii NW   (9) 
The expected income of the remaining members is  
  ( )
tt
iiR MNW -   (10) 
where 
t
R W  is the nominal reservation wage, i.e. the wage rate expected to prevail outside the 
firm under consideration.  
The overall workers’ compensation if the contract is concluded is given by summing (9) 
and (10): The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Workers’ rent is given by the difference between (11) and (12): 










  (13) 
Efficient (Nash) bargaining between firm’s  i and the associated union corresponds to 
choosing 
t
i N  (
t
i p ) and 
t
i W  so as to maximise the following expression subject to (7): 




=-- %   (14) 
where 0 < b < 1 represents the relative bargaining power of the unions. In Blanchard and 
Gavazzi, b is the only parameter for studying the effects of labour market deregulation. 
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Note the familiar result from the efficient bargaining problem, namely that a position is 
chosen off the profit maximum. In equation (16), the marginal revenue is equated to the 
nominal reservation wage and not to the marginal cost (corresponding to the nominal wage 
rate). From equation (16) it follows that the price is set as a mark-up over the reservation 
wage,  ( ) 1
tt
iR pW m =+ % , where  ( ) 11 ms ”- .  
Following Blanchard  and Gavazzi, we interpret a decrease of the mark-up  m (i.e. an 
increase in s) as commodity market deregulation. It reduces the size of firm i’s anticipated 
surplus per unit of output,  ( )
ttt
iRR pWW m -= % . Labour market deregulation is reflected in 
Blanchard an Gavazzi by a decrease the relative bargaining power of the union, b. As 
equation (15) shows, b determines the distribution of the anticipated surplus between wages 
and profits. Decreasing b reduces the workers’ share in the surplus, 
t
R W bm . In addition, our 
model as developed in the following sections allows for labour market deregulation in the 
form of changing the unemployment insurance scheme. Also this form of labour market 
deregulation  may impinge on the bargaining outcome (and on the size of the surplus) 
through its effects on the nominal reservation wage.  
Note finally that equations (16) and (17) are not independent results, equation (17) can be 
obtained from equation (16) taking constraint (7) into account.  
During Week t, at the end of contracting, firm i employs 
t
i N  workers paying the nominal 
wage rate 
t
i W  and it anticipates the price 
t
i p % . Figure 1 depicts the bargaining or partial The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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equilibrium. Given the reservation wage 
t
R W  and the position of the anticipated demand 
function Kt, the bargain determines the wage rate and the employment level in firm i.  
 
2.3 Short term commodity markets equilibrium 
The characteristics of the general equilibrium  follow from the assumption that all firms 
behave identically (what is called the symmetry assumption in Blanchard and Giavazzi). 
Each firm pays the same wage 
t
it WW = , hires the same number of workers, 
t
it NN = , to 
produce the same quantity 
t
it xx = , which is equal to their respective supplies 
t
itt ssx ==. 
They envisage to sell these quantities at an identical anticipated price 
tt
i pp = %% . At the end of 
the production period, on Friday, each firm supplies  t s  to the (identical) true demand 
function. In contrast to the anticipated demand functions, the true demand functions take 
into account the reactions of all other firms; each of them therefore has an elasticity of  1 -  
(instead of  s - ). Assuming flexible prices and commodity market-clearing, the realized 
market price  ˆt p will differ from the anticipated one.
2  Using (5) it is determined as: 
  ˆ





==   (18) 
                                                 
2 Note that the difference  ˆ
t
ti pp - %  determines the difference between firm  i’s realised and 
anticipated rent per unit of output  ( ) ( ) ˆ
ttt
tRiR pWpW --- %  and also the difference between 
realised and anticipated profit given the residual nature of the former.   The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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The short run general equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. 
Finally, on Saturday firms and unions update their information. The position of firm i’s 
anticipated demand curve changes on account of the realised price  ˆt p  and the realised 
demand  ˆ
t d . Inserting this information in equation  (6) determines the position of the 
anticipated demand for the period t+1:  
  1 ˆ ˆ ttt Kdp
s
+ =   (19) 
Similarly, workers’ reservation wage adjusts in the light of the realised nominal wage Wt 








3. The dynamic system 
3.1. Outline 
The dynamic behaviour of the model, therefore, involves two processes. First, since 
producers do not know the true elasticity of the demand function, the position of the 
anticipated demand function (and thus of the anticipated marginal revenue) shifts over time. 
For a given nominal reservation wage and marginal revenue curve, the efficient bargaining 
outcome, 
t
R MRW = , determines employment. Since all firms are identical, equation (17) 
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and, taking into account equations (18) and (19), also as 
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  (21) 
Second, the nominal reservation wage, 
t
R W , is also adjusted over time.  
For expository purposes, in what follows we begin our study with the dynamics of the first 
process in isolation by assuming a nominal reservation wage invariant over time. After that 
we  specify the adjustment of the reservation wage change explicitly  and explore the 
dynamic properties of the full system. 
3.2. Commodity market dynamics in isolation 
If we assume a reservation wage fixed at an arbitrarily chosen level, 
t
RR WW = , the implied 
dynamic process is  
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  (22) 
Equation  (22)  is a one-dimensional  first-return  map the following  fixed point and  first 
derivative  
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, but looses stability at s = 2. Eq. (24) shows that the derivative of the 
first return map is negative for all values of the employment rate; therefore, the time path 
diverges for  s > 2. Deregulating the commodity market increases the stationary 
employment but may eventually lead to instability.  
Figure 3 illustrates the period 2 cycle occurring precisely at s = 2. The employment rate 
alternates between  e1 and e2; the anticipated demand and anticipated  marginal revenue 
functions shift accordingly. Starting with the anticipated demand function 1 and  the 
corresponding anticipated marginal revenue function 1, the bargaining process results in the 
higher employment rate e1. The realised market price is below the anticipated one. The 
anticipated demand and marginal revenue curves shift downward to the position 2. The next 
bargaining results in the lower employment rate e2. The market price is now above the 
anticipated one inducing an upward shift of the anticipated demand and marginal revenue 
back to their respective position 1. 
3.3. The nominal reservation wage as a function of the employment rate 
Next we introduce a positive dependence on the employment rate of the  nominal 
reservation wage,  1 () - =
t
RRt WWe : A higher employment rate is considered as increasing the 
expected employment probabilities outside the firm under consideration and thus as 
increasing the reservation wage. As a consequence, the adjustment  of the nominal 
reservation wage affects the commodity market dynamics. The resulting dynamic system is 
still one-dimensional: The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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The fixed point is 
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The first derivative of (25) is 


































  (27) 
The fixed point n ow looses stability at s < 2; beyond that value the time path diverges. 
Therefore, a positive influence of the employment rate on the nominal reservation wage 
destabilises the economy.
3 
                                                 
3 Blanchard and Giavazzi consider the real reservation wage to be an implicit function of 
the employment rate. However, it is not possible to assess the stability properties of their The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Looking at Figure 3, this destabilising effect can be illustrated. Start from the market result 
1 and consider the determination of position 2. The anticipated demand function and the 
anticipated marginal revenue shift again towards their position 2; but now, in addition, the 
nominal reservation wage is increased because of  the high realised employment rate e1. 
Therefore, the new employment rate 2 will be below e2 in the figure. The increase in the 
nominal reservation wage thus increases the fluctuations. The process is destabilised. 
3.4. The nominal reservation wage as a function of the employment rate and of its lagged 
value 
Finally we allow also for a positive influence of the lagged reservation wage upon its 
current value: 






RRtR WWeW   (28) 
with positive partial derivatives; that is, the function  () g R W  is monotonically increasing in 
both arguments. The rationale for the dependence of the nominal reservation wage on the 
employment rate is as sketched above; for the second one it runs along the following lines: 
a high reservation wage in  t-1 will result in a high bargained nominal wage rate in  t-1 
which in turn is expected to raise the nominal reservation wage in t.  
The central dynamic system is now two-dimensional and given by equations (21) and (28). 
                                                                                                                                                     
model without specifying a relationship between the reservation wage and the employment 
rate. In what follows we put forward such a specification.  The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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In the fixed point the following holds 
  ( ) , RR WeW q =   (29) 
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  (33) 
Figure 3 can be used to illustrate that the additional effect introduced by equation (28) is 
potentially stabilising. Start again with the market position realised in period 1 and consider 
the determination of the position 2. The anticipated demand function and the anticipated 
marginal revenue shift to their respective position 2. The nominal reservation wage will be 
changed by two factors. As in the previous case, the high employment rate e1 tends to 
increase it. At the same time, the high employment rate  e1 implies that the bargained The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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nominal wage in period 1 was comparatively low. This would reduce the nominal 
reservation wage, thus introducing a stabilising element. 
Without specifying explicitly the dynamic adjustment process for the nominal reservation 
wage, it is difficult to assess the stability properties. We provide such a specification in the 
following section and explore the dynamics of the full model. 
 
4. Fully specified dynamics and numerical simulations 
4.1 . The dynamic adjustment process for the nominal reservation wage 
The reservation wage in the bargaining process represents the income expected by the trade 
union for members who do not find employment in the firm under consideration. It 
therefore depends on the expected probability of finding employment in other firms, on the 
wage rate expected to be paid by other firms and on the unemployment  benefit  Bt. 
Consonant with the monopolistic competition set up, we assume that the trade unions do 
not take into consideration reactions of other firms and the impact of their own decisions on 
the aggregate variables. The expected probability of finding employment in other firms and 
the expected wage rate outside the firm under consideration is therefore given by the 
respective values realised in the previous period.  
  111 (1)
t
Rtttt WeWeB --- =+-   (34) 
For the unemployment benefit we consider two different specifications (see e.g. Layard et 
al., 1991, and Pissarides, 1998) mirroring two possible institutional set-ups. The first is 
close to a social a ssistance scheme according to which the compensation for the The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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unemployed is fixed in real terms and the nominal payment is adjusted each period to the 
realised price,  1 ˆ tt Bp w - = . In the second, the compensation for the unemployed worker 
corresponds to a fraction of the nominal wage rate she was receiving in the previous period, 
Bt = fWt–1, where 0 < f < 1 is the replacement ratio. Therefore, taking into consideration 
the symmetry assumption the reservation wage is given by 
  ( ) 111 ˆ ,, --- =
t
RRttt WWeWp  (35) 
Note that, using equ. (15) and equ. (18), this equation can be transformed into equ. (28). 
Combing equations (15) and (34), results in  
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  (36) 
At this stage  we have  to introduce  explicitly  the  two alternative  specifications of the 
unemployment benefit mentioned above. Such specifications will allow us to clarify the 
role of changes in parameters, which relate to the unemployment benefit, as measures of 
(de)regulation in the labour market. 
4.2  Unemployment benefit fixed in real terms  
We consider first the institutional set up for the unemployment benefit close to a social 
assistance system. The real unemployment benefit consists of a commodity bundle w, its 
nominal counterpart is given by  1 ˆt p w - . The dynamic system is  
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A crucial feature of this specification is that the realised market position impacts on the 
dynamics both through the determination of the nominal reservation wage, as shown in 
equation (37), and through shifts of the demand function, implicit in equation (38).  



































   (40) 








  (41) 
Note that the fixed point solutions and the stability properties only depend upon three 
parameters:  the parameter reflecting the degree of monopoly power in the commodity 
markets, s or m; and the two parameters related with the extent of labour market regulation, 
namely with the bargaining power of trade unions b and with the parameter concerning the 
specification of the real unemployment benefit  w.  These parameters are subject to the 






=  represents the 
stationary real reservation wage. Choosing an upper limit for s  therefore allows to study 
the entire parameter space numerically. Later on, we assume s £ 5 (or  0.25 m ‡ ). The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Appendix 1 investigates analytically  the properties of the dynamic system  (37)-(38). It is 
shown that the fixed point exhibits the usual comparative static results: Commodity and 
labour market deregulation – as reflected in a higher value of s and in  lower values of b 
and w, respectively – engender a higher employment rate. The analysis further shows that 
the fixed point is stable for low values of s and for high values of b and w. However, in 
contrast to the one-dimensional models studied previously, the stability loss now occurs 
through a Flip bifurcation giving rise to attracting  cyclical and eventually to chaotic 
fluctuations. Therefore, commodity and labour market deregulation – though expected to 
increase the stationary employment rate – may destabilize the economy, but does not lead 
to diverging time paths. 
Figures 4 to 6 collect several bifurcation diagrams illustrating the possible complex 
dynamics; on the bottom of each figure, the average employment rate is compared with its 
stationary couterpart. Figure 4 explores the implications of varying b: On the fixed points 
of higher order the average employment rate still increases with a reduction in b. However, 
it is considerably lower than the equilibrium employment rate and even on a period two 
cycle both the upper and the lower value may lie well below the equilibrium value.  
Figure 5 shows the dynamic effects of changing w. In this case – in stark contrast to the 
fixed point result – average employment declines on the higher period fixed points with a 
reduction in w.  
Deregulating the labour market – that is, reducing b and/or w –not only endangers stability 
but may even reduce average employment.  The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
  21 
Figure 6 investigates the implications of commodity market deregulation, as reflected in a 
increase of s. Also in this case, deregulation increases the stationary employment rates, but 
may eventually lead to instability. On the higher order fixed points average employment 
rates may even decline with higher values of s.  
So far we have explored analytically  the dynamics properties of the system (37)-(38) and 
illustrated the results by simulations. We now turn to a calibration exercise: we search for 
values of b, w and s such that the fixed point approximates some macroeconomic facts and 
we ask which dynamic properties the time path exhibits close to that fixed point. We use 
1990s continental Europe economic evidence for the employment rate ( which typically 
assumes values above 0.8) and the wage share (which typically assumes values slightly 
below 0.6)
4. From the calibration exercise we find that there are parameter constellations 
resulting in plausible fixed points which exhibit stability, which loose stability with 
commodity or labour market deregulation giving rise to cyclical time paths with relatively 







 plotted in Figure 7 in which w = 0.506, s = 2.15 and the values of 
b correspond to stable fixed points ( b = 0.02 and  b = 0.015) and to an unstable one 
(b = 0.01). Below the bifurcation value of the parameter referring to the bargaining power 
of workers,  0.016 bif b @ , the time path loses stability and the resulting time paths exhibit 
                                                 
4 Taking the average over a significant group of European Countries, Giammarioli et al. 
(2002) estimate that in the 1990s the labour share was 58.60 pct in the Business sector, 
58.01 pct in Industry and 53.61 pct in the Tradable Services. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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fluctuations with a comparatively small amplitude (smaller that 0.15 for the employment 
rate and smaller than 0.1 for the wage share). 
 
4.3. The unemployment benefit as a fixed proportion of the nominal wage rate 
We now consider another institutional set up according to which the unemployment benefit 
is a fixed replacement ratio f of the nominal wage rate earned in the lost job, Bt = fWt–1. 
The system (36) and (21) can be written as  
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Note that the analytical structure of this specification is simpler than the previous one given 
that the realised market position only affects the dynamics through shifts of the demand 
function implicit in equation (43). The fixed point, the partial derivatives, the trace and the 
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The major conclusions from the previous case carry over:  As is shown in Appendix 2, 
deregulation in the labour or the commodity market increases the stationary employment 
rate, but may eventually lead to a Flip bifurcation of the fixed point giving rise to attracting 
period two cycles and eventually to complex time paths. Therefore, the basic trade off 
remains present: Deregulation increases employment rates but may destabilise the 
economy.  
First computer simulations (not presented here) show that in the unstable region further 
deregulation usually increase average employment rates. The amplitude of the cyclical time 




In the previous paper, we have analysed the dynamics of a model following closely the 
prototype specification put forward by Blanchard and Gavazzi combining monopolistic 
competition in the commodity market and efficient bargaining in the labour market. The 
dynamics results from two sources: First, inherent to monopolistic competition is that each 
single supplier overestimates the price-elasticity of his demand function; each single 
supplier is therefore necessarily surprised by the market outcome and will adapt his 
anticipated demand function accordingly. Second, efficient bargaining processes are based 
on a reservation wage indicating the expected income outside the firm under consideration. 
Also this anticipation is adjusted in the light of realised market results. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
  24 
While the second process may be specified in various forms, the first one is directly implied 
by the external effect at the core of the monopolistic competition model itself. There are no 
alternative specifications without leaving the assumed market structure. In the paper it is 
shown, that the first necessary process may destabilise the economy: Deregulation  does 
increase the stationary employment rate, but engenders diverging time paths. Introducing 
various plausible specifications for the adjustment process of the reservation wage dampens 
this sharp result: The stability loss occurs through a Flip bifurcation giving rise not to 
diverging time paths but to attracting period-two cycles and eventually to complex time 
paths. However, the basic trade-off remains: Deregulation increases the stationary 
employment but may lead to instability with time paths exhibiting in some cases even lower 
average employment rates. 
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Appendix 1 
In this appendix we study the dynamic system related to the case in which the employment 
benefit is fixed in real terms and its nominal counterpart is adjusted to the price index, 
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  (A1.48) 
A1.1 Fixed point and comparative statics 
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=   (A1.51) 
Note that if condition  
  w << R ww    (A1.52) 
holds, then  01 e <<. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Note that the stationary real reservation wage depends only on s  whereas the stationary 
real wage rate depends on b and s and the stationary employment rate depends on w, b and 
s . We have 
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¶-¶¶ ￿￿ =-=> ￿￿ ¶¶¶ Łł
  (A1.56) 
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A1.2 Bifurcation analysis 
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Determinant and Trace are:  













  (A1.60) 
with  det0 E J -¥<< and  tr1 E J -¥<< . 
The violation of one of the following conditions would involve instability for the system (in 
brackets the type of bifurcation involved): 













 (saddle node bifurcation); 
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Conditions (i) and (ii) always hold as long as s > 1 and  w > R w . The flip bifurcation is the 
only possible. Condition (iii) corresponds to 














  (A1.61) 
In this condition for stability, the denominator is always positive. Therefore, the system is 
stable for 
  [ ] [ ] (32)(43)(1)()(34) swsbswssw -+->---- RRRR wwww  









s << . The stability of the system depends upon the parameter values. There 










R w . It follows  ( ) ( ) 34322 sswsw ->-> R w . In this case,  the 

























  (A1.62) 
If  b  falls below this value, the system looses stability through a Flip-bifurcation. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 


























That is, the system is always stable. 
Case 3:  2 s < . As for Case 2, the stability of the system depends upon the parameter 







































In this appendix we examine some of the properties of the dynamic system related to the 
case in which the employment benefit is a proportion of the nominal wage rate earned in 
the lost job, Bt = fWt–1. The dynamic system is 
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  (A2.65) 
A2.1 Fixed point and comparative statics 




















=   (A2.67) 
Note that if condition  
  (1)(1)0 sffb --->   (A2.68) 
holds and b > 0, then  01 e <<. 



















== R ww   (A2.69) 
The stationary real wage rate depends on  b and s and the stationary employment rate 
depends on f, b and s. This is a consequence of our assumption according to which the 
reservation wage depends on the unemployment rate, on the nominal wage rate and the 
unemployment benefit. The comparative statics of the stationary state involves: The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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  (A2.73)  
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A2.2 Bifurcation analysis  
The Jacobian evaluated at the fixed point is The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Determinant and Trace are: 
  det1 E J s =-   (A2.76) 








  (A2.77) 
  with    det0 E J -¥<< . 
The violation of one of the following conditions would involve instability for the system (in 
brackets the type of bifurcation involved): 
(iv)  1det0 E J s -=>  (Hopf bifurcation); 








 (saddle node bifurcation); 








 (flip bifurcation). 
Conditions (i) and (ii) always hold as long as condition (A2.68) holds. The flip bifurcation 
is the only possible. Condition (iii) corresponds to 
  [ ]
2 (3)7(1)40 fsbfs ----+<  (A2.78) 
If condition (A2.78) is not satisfied, the system looses stability through a Flip-bifurcation. The dynamics of wages and employment    30/03/2003 8:57 PM 
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Define that value of s corresponding to the highest root that satisfies condition (A2.78) 












  (A2.79) 
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  bif ss <  
with 0  < fbif < 1, iff  z(0, b) < s < z(1, b), 0  < bbif < 1 iff  z(f, 0) < s < z(f, 1) and  
sbif = z(f, b) for 0 < b < 1 and 0 < f < 1. 
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